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Causes for Sluggish Foreign Direct Investment in Korea:  
A Foreign Perspective 
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In spite of the liberalisation of the FDI regime since the 1997 
financial crisis, the magnitude of FDI in Korea is smaller than a level 
comparable internationally, and has declined significantly in the recent 
past.  To address the issue of flagging FDI in Korea, a comprehensive 
survey was undertaken of foreign companies in Korea.  The survey 
results show that foreign firms undertake investment in Korea mainly 
to capitalise on the emerging business opportunities and that there is 
substantial room for improvement in the areas of government 
regulations and the business environment.  To further attract FDI, 
therefore, not only should Korea undertake an across-the-board 
liberalization of the FDI regime, but it should also make concerted 
efforts to improve the operational environment for foreign businesses.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Until the 1997 financial crisis, South Korea (Korea hereafter) was 
regarded as the worst place to invest among Asian countries (Booz.Allan & 
Hamilton, 1997, p. 28; Far Eastern Economic Review, 1998).  To protect 
domestic industries Korea restricted incoming foreign direct investment 
(FDI) with a heavy burden of laws and  regulations.  A number of sectors 
were closed to FDI by law until the early 1990s and even in those areas 
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where FDI was permitted, the administrative regulations and procedures for 
FDI were complex and lacked transparency.  The Korean economic 
structure, society and culture were not conducive either to incoming FDI.  
The labour market lacked flexibility, thereby raising labour costs to one of 
the highest among the Asian newly industrialised countries (NICs).  The 
real estate sector was closed to foreigners and overhead costs were among the 
highest in Asia (Cha, 2001; Jwa and Yi, 2001; Kwon, 2001).   
The formal restrictions on FDI and environmental disincentives were 
reflected in the flagging level of FDI in Korea.  According to UNCTAD’s 
World Investment Report 2002, inward FDI in Korea over the 1990-1997 
period amounted to less than one percent (0.96 percent) of its gross fixed 
capital formation, while the proportions for the world and East Asian 
countries were 4.7 percent and 7.4 percent respectively.  The inward FDI 
stock in Korea as a percentage of current GDP in 1995 was 2.0 percent, 
compared to the proportions of 10.0 percent and 18.9 percent for the world 
and East Asia respectively (UNCTAD, 2002).   
Since 1997, however, Korea has liberalised the FDI regime up to the level 
of other OECD countries and switched its policy emphasis on FDI from 
‘restriction and control’ to ‘promotion and assistance’.  Korean society and 
the business community as well as the government have sought to improve 
the Korean business environment.  As of 2002, 99.8 percent of all business 
sectors were open to foreign investment – a level on par with that of other 
OECD economies (Sohn, Yang, and Kim, 2002).  The labour market was 
reformed to improve its flexibility, and the real estate sector was opened to 
foreigners.  The government has streamlined the complicated administrative 
procedures for FDI by dismantling or relaxing more than 50 percent of 
restrictions (Kwon, 2001).  In addition, it has introduced the so-called “one-
stop” service system for inward FDI.  As a result, FDI in Korea increased 
substantially over the three-year period (1998-2000). 
Notwithstanding this rapid increase in FDI, the magnitude of FDI in Korea 
is still small by international comparison.  Furthermore, as shown shortly, 
FDI in Korea fell sharply for the three consecutive years from 2001 to 2003.  
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The Korean government has undertaken a series of policy measures in an all-
out effort to attract FDI.  How, then, can this relatively low magnitude of 
FDI in Korea and recent sharp declines be explained? What additional or 
alternative measures should the Korean government undertake to increase 
FDI inflows to a level comparable internationally?  This paper attempts to 
address these vexing questions.  In particular, it attempts to identify and 
explain the factors underlying sluggish FDI in Korea from the perspective of 
foreign investors in Korea.   
Although a number of studies are available in the literature on FDI in 
Korea (Kim and Choo, 2002; Kim and Kim, 2003; Kim 2003; Sohn, Yang, 
and Kim, 2002), most of these were undertaken by Korean scholars in Korea 
from a domestic perspective.  There is no in-depth study of the issue from a 
foreign perspective.  Yet, the views of foreign business people who have 
investment and business experiences in Korea are critically important 
because it is these people that Korea must convince if it seeks to attract FDI.   
It is thus appropriate to investigate the latest developments of FDI in Korea 
from the perspectives of foreign investors and business expatriates.   
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
Any viable strategy, either by governments or by private firms, to attract 
or undertake FDI must be based on relevant and accurate market information.  
One of the most effective sources of information is companies with first hand 
experiences of undertaking FDI and operating overseas businesses.  To this 
end, a comprehensive survey was undertaken from May to July 2002 of 
foreign companies that had undertaken FDI and were operating businesses in 
Korea.  In developing the questionnaire for the survey, it was attempted to 
include a large number of factors for FDI identified in literature on FDI 
(Dunning, 1998 and 2000; Kojima, 1978; Knickerbocker, 1973; Pearce and 
Robinson, 1994).  These factors include not only numerous spheres of 
Korea’s international business environment but also on-site managerial 
restrictions and the living conditions of foreign expatriates in Korea.  It 
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appears that earlier studies have paid little attention to on-site management as 
a determining factor for FDI.  In addition, recent changes in the Korean 
business environment, particularly since 1997 are taken into account, 
acknowledging their influences on FDI in Korea. 
A questionnaire was thus developed, which was comprised of eight 
sections and 78 specific questions related to various aspects of the FDI 
environment in Korea.  Respondents were questioned on: (i) general 
characteristics of responding companies, (ii) determinants of their direct 
investment in Korea, (iii) difficulties in the FDI preparation process, (iv) 
improvements in the Korean business environment, (v) difficulties in on-site 
management, (vi) recent changes in Korean chaebols, (vii) the characteristics 
of Korean workers, and (viii) changes in the living conditions of foreign 
expatriates.  The questionnaire was then distributed to about 400 foreign 
companies in Korea and 69 of them responded.1) For the survey, foreign 
companies in Korea were chosen from those listed in 2002 in the Chambers 
of Commerce in Korea of the United States, Canada, Japan, EU, and 
Australia-New Zealand.   
The present research is an ‘exploratory’ study with a focus on addressing 
the research question of what perceptions foreign business people have of 
Korea as an investment target country.2) No attempt has been made to test any  
hypothesis or to draw causality relationships.  Nor has any attempt been 
made to identify differences in response among different industries because 
of a small number of responses.  However, it should be pointed out that, as 
mentioned above, the survey is quite comprehensive and includes a large 
number of factors for FDI and the FDI environment in Korea. 
No attempt has been made to conduct validity and reliability tests of the 
                                            
1) It was learned that the response rate of sample surveys of foreign companies in Korea was 
dismally low as they were all inundated with such surveys. It was also learned that the 
response rates were markedly different by national backgrounds of the foreign companies in 
Korea. Hence, random selection of companies was abandoned. Therefore, companies were 
chosen based on the increased likelihood that they would respond following suggestions 
from the officials at the Korean Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy and at foreign 
Chambers of Commerce.    
2) For the concept of exploratory studies, see Neuman (2000, p. 21). 
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data (responses) because the response to each question is a one-time and one-
form measurement.  However, various measures have been undertaken to 
enhance validity and reliability.  First, each of the questions in the 
questionnaire is based on theoretical concepts in the literature of FDI.3) 
Second, a draft questionnaire was commented on by a number of colleagues, 
and a pilot survey was conducted with a draft questionnaire that was 
completed by a number of foreign business people in Korea on a person-to-
person basis.  Through these processes, the format of the questionnaire was 
finalised.4)  Third, as mentioned above, a large number of questions (78 
questions in eight sections), representing all spheres of FDI and Korea’s 
international business environment, was contained in the questionnaire to 
enhance the validity of the data (Neuman 2000: 168).  Finally, in order to 
supplement the survey and garner additional information, personal interviews 
were conducted with a number of the responding company representatives 
and some foreign business expatriates. 
In order to highlight the seriousness of the issues under consideration, 
Section 3 examines recent trends and major characteristics of FDI in Korea in 
light of global trends in FDI.  Since government policy is critically 
important for FDI in Korea, an overview of the FDI regime and its changes 
after the 1997 crisis is provided in Section 4.  Then, the findings of the 
survey are discussed in Section 5.  Finally, Section 6 contains conclusions 
of the study and recommends strategies for attracting FDI in Korea. 
 
3. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FDI IN KOREA 
  
Inflows of FDI in Korea have increased remarkably since the 1997 crisis in 
response to the liberalisation of the FDI regime and improvement in the 
business environment.  As shown in Table 1, FDI in Korea leaped from $2.8 
billion in 1997 to $5.4 billion in 1998, and further to $9.3 billion in both 
1999 and 2000.  However, the magnitude of FDI in Korea is still small 
                                            
3) This is a way of enhancing validity of the questions in the questionnaire (Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias 1996, p. 168; Neuman, 2000, p. 167). 
4) These are tactics to enhance validity of the data (Yin, 1984). 
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Table 1  FDI Inflows in Korea and Other East Asian Countries 
 
              (units: $bill, %) 
 
1990-95 
(avg.) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
FDI in Korea 
($bill) 
1.0 2.3 2.8 5.4 9.3 9.3 3.5 2.0 
World 225.3 396.1 478.1 686.0 1079.1 1393.0 823.8 651.2 
E. Asia* 44.6 87.8 96.3 90.1 105.3 138.7 97.6 88.6 
FDI/GI**, Korea 
(%) 
0.8 1.2 1.7 5.7 8.3 7.1 3.1 1.5 
FDI/GI, World 4.1 5.9 7.4 10.9 16.5 20.8 12.8 12.2 
FDI/GI, E. Asia 6.7 9.1 10.0 11.0 12.2 14.8 10.3 7.3 
Notes: * E. Asia includes South, East and Southeast Asia. 
** GI denotes gross fixed capital formation. 
Source: UNCTAD (2003).   
 
when compared to other countries.  In 2000, FDI in Korea accounted for 7.1 
percent of gross fixed capital formation, while the corresponding figures for 
the world and East Asia were 20.8 percent and 14.8 percent respectively 
(Table 1).  In the same year, the ratio of FDI stock to GDP was 8.0 percent 
in Korea, while 19.6 percent and 37.0 percent, respectively, for the world and 
East Asia (Table 2).  Furthermore, as shown in Table 1, FDI in Korea fell 
sharply for two consecutive years from 2001 to 2002.  During this two-year 
period, the FDI ratio to gross fixed formation also declined, and was 
remarkably lower than those for the world and East Asia.  Similarly, the 
ratio of FDI stock to GDP was also markedly lower than the corresponding 
ratios for the world and East Asia (Tables 1 and 2). 
FDI in Korea played only a minor role in increasing the levels of value added 
and employment.  In 1999, the level of value added by foreign affiliates as a 
percentage of GDP was 3.1 percent in Korea compared to 18.4 percent on average 
of 33 developing countries.  In the same year, employment by foreign affiliates 
accounted for only 2.2 percent of total employment in Korea, while the ratio was 
4.8 percent for the average of 33 developing countries (UNCTAD, 2002, p. 275). 
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Table 2  Inward FDI Stocks as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
            (unit: %) 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
Korea 2.1 2.3 2.1 1.9 8.0 9.5 9.2 
World 6.7 8.4 9.3 10.3 19.6 21.2 22.3 
East Asia 27.9 24.9 20.9 21.1 37.0 37.2 37.9 
Source: UNCTAD (2003). 
         
Korea has attracted less FDI than could be expected given the size of its 
national economy.  In recent years UNCTAD has put forward an inward 
FDI performance index, which is the ratio of a country’s share in global FDI 
flows to its share in global GDP.  Countries with an index value greater than 
one attract more FDI than may be expected on the basis of relative GDP.  
According to this index, Korea scored poorly – one of the lowest scores in 
East Asia.  The values for Korea were 0.5 and 0.6 for the 1988–1990 and 
1998–2000 periods respectively, ranking it 93rd and 87th among 140 
countries over these periods (UNCTAD, 2002, p. 25).  In the 1998–2000 
period, Korea ranked the third lowest among East Asian countries, followed 
by Taiwan with an index number of 0.3 and ranking of 112 and Japan with an 
index number of 0.1 and ranking of 131.   
Korea has clearly failed to attract FDI to its full potential.  According to 
the UNCTAD inward FDI potential index, estimated through a set of key 
measurable factors that are expected to affect inward FDI, Korea fared 
reasonably well, ranked 19th and 18th, respectively, among 140 countries in 
the periods 1988–1990 and 1998–2000.5)  By comparing the rankings on the 
performance and potential indices of inward FDI, UNCTAD designates 
Korea as one of the “below-potential economies”, with a weak FDI 
performance because of government policy, a tradition of low reliance on 
                                            
5) The factors used in estimating the UNCTAD inward FDI potential index included: the rate of 
growth of GDP; per capita GDP; share of exports in GDP; telephone lines per 1000 
inhabitants; commercial energy use per capita; share of R&D expenditures in gross national 
income; share of tertiary students in population; and country risk. The index is an 
unweighted average of the normalized values of these variables (UNCTAD, 2002, p. 24).  
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FDI, political and social factors, and weak international competitiveness 
(UNCTAD, 2002, p. 32).  
The trend of FDI inflows in Korea from a domestic data source is 
consistent with the trend that is shown in Table 1 which is in turn based on 
the UNCTAD sources.  As shown in Table 3, FDI in Korea rose from $3.2 
billion in 1996 to $7.0 billion in 1997, continued to increase to $15.5 billion 
in 1999, and then slightly declined to $15.2 billion in 2000.  It then declined 
significantly in the three consecutive years (2001-03) to $6.5 in 2003.  It 
should be noted that FDI data in Table 3 are from the Ministry of Commerce, 
Industry and Energy (MOCIE) of Korea – not from UNCTAD, and that FDI 
values in Table 3 are on an approval (or notification) basis in contrast to a 
realisation basis of UNCTAD’s FDI data in Tables 1 and 2.   
In terms of industries, more than 60 percent of FDI in Korea was 
traditionally undertaken in the manufacturing sector (Table 3).  However, 
since the 1997 crisis the  share of FDI in the manufacturing sector has 
declined, while increasing in the service sector.  Over the three-year period 
(2001-2003), in particular, the service sector accounted on average for 70 
percent of FDI, while the FDI share of the manufacturing sector declined to 
27 percent.  It should be noted that decreases in FDI in the manufacturing 
sector over the 2001-2003 period accounted for almost all the decreases in 
FDI in Korea.  This may reflect the structural change in the Korean 
economy and the opening of the service sector after the financial crisis.  At 
the same time, the decline in FDI in the manufacturing sector may indicate 
the loss of international competitiveness of the sector in the recent past.  
Primary industries – agriculture, fisheries and mining – have continued to 
attract an insignificant amount of FDI, except in 2003 when its share of FDI 
increased to 9.9 percent. 
As examined above, inward FDI has increased substantially and become 
an increasingly important component of the Korean economy in recent years.  
This has been attributed to the changes in the FDI regime and a series of 
policy measures to attract FDI.  Nonetheless, Korea has clearly failed to 
attract FDI to its full potential or to a level comparable internationally.  It is  
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Table 3  FDI by Industry on Approval Basis 
                                                   ($mill and %) 
 
1962-
1995 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Primary 
industries 
42 
(0.3) 
18 
(0.6) 
55 
(0.9) 
179 
(2.0) 
54 
(0.3) 
3 
( - ) 
9 
( - ) 
18 
(0.2) 
639 
(9.9) 
Manufac-
turing 
8686 
(60.0) 
1930 
(60.3) 
2348 
(33.7) 
5735 
(64.8) 
7129 
(45.9) 
6649 
(43.7) 
3090 
(27.4) 
2432 
(26.7) 
1697 
(26.2) 
Services 
5744 
(39.7) 
1254 
(39.1) 
4568 
(65.6) 
2938 
(33.2) 
8359 
(53.8) 
8565 
(56.3) 
8192 
(72.5) 
6651 
(73.0) 
4131 
(63.9) 
Total 
14472 
(100.0) 
3203 
(100.0) 
6971 
(100.0) 
8853 
(100.0)
15542 
(100.0) 
15217 
(100.0) 
11292 
(100.0)
9101 
(100.0) 
6467 
(100.0) 
Note: On approval basis 
Source: MOCIE (2004) 
 
thus necessary to understand how and to what extent the FDI regime has 
changed in Korea. 
 
  
4. THE KOREAN FDI REGIME 
 
4.1. FDI Policy before the 1997 Financial Crisis 
 
Unlike trade, for which international rules exist under the GATT and WTO, 
there has been no significant progress made on investment-related 
multilateral rules for FDI.  In the absence of international guidelines, Korea 
pursued a singular FDI policy that restricted and discouraged inward FDI 
over a long period of time until the mid-1980s.  From the mid-1980s, 
however, Korea began to liberalise the FDI regime under rising pressure 
from trade partners, thereby opening more business categories to FDI and 
relaxing restrictive regulations.  Also, the FDI permission system was 
changed from a “positive system” to a “negative system”, whereby FDI could 
enter any industries except for those with specific prohibition.   
Over the period 1990–97, Korea further liberalised its FDI regime with the 
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launch of the WTO and its admission to the OECD in 1996.  The approval 
system of relevant government organisations for FDI was replaced by a 
reporting system.  Non-hostile M&A were allowed and long-term offshore 
borrowings with terms of five years or longer were liberalised.  However, 
the basic position of the government towards FDI was passive and restrictive, 
except for in high technology areas.  Under the anti-FDI policy, a number of 
sectors were closed to FDI by law until the mid-1990s.  These included 
most service industries (distribution including wholesale and retail industries, 
communications, transport, banking and financing, insurance, trust, real 
estate, investment consulting, and business services), the agricultural sector, 
and heavy and chemical industries.  Even in those areas that permitted FDI, 
the administrative regulations and processes for FDI were complex and 
lacked transparency.   
The Korean economic structure, society and business culture were not 
conducive to incoming FDI either.  The Korean economy was heavily 
concentrated in a handful of large chaebols that enjoyed various types of 
institutionalised advantages over foreign firms (Kwon, 2001).  
Compounding these problems, Korean society had been xenophobic, and 
failed to appreciate the economic benefits of FDI.  Korean business culture 
has not been congruous with foreign investors, and Koreans in general 
preferred to work for domestic firms rather than foreign firms.  The Korean 
labour market was not flexible and unions were renowned for their militant 
tactics.  Restrictive zoning laws raised real estate prices extraordinarily high 
and foreigners were prohibited from purchasing real estate.  As a result, 
Korea was regarded as the worst place to invest among Asian countries until 
1997 (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1998).   
From this brief survey of government policy toward incoming FDI and the 
business environment in Korea prior to the 1997 crisis, we have observed 
both structural and social impediments to foreign interests that sought to 
enter the Korean market.  The consequences of Korea’s restrictive policy 
toward FDI and the business environment have been huge.  The sudden 
crippling of the economy born out of the 1997 financial crisis was an 
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inescapable watershed, signalling unmistakably that both the structure and 
the principles that had supported Korea could not be sustained.  As a 
consequence, Korea had to make a shift in policy principles not only 
regarding FDI but also other areas.  The business environment and 
management also had to undertake fundamental changes.   
 
4.2. Liberalisation of the FDI Regime after 1997 
 
Since the onset of the 1997 financial crisis, Korea has switched its policy 
emphasis on FDI from ‘restriction and control’ to ‘promotion and assistance’ 
and has undertaken a series of policy measures and all-out efforts to improve 
the business environment to attract FDI.  With the enactment of the new 
Foreign Investment Promotion Act in 1998, replacing the Foreign Capital 
Inducement Act enacted in 1966, Korea has liberalised the FDI regime to the 
general extent of OECD practices (Bishop 2001).  The new Act has opened 
more business sectors (including the service sector) to FDI, making the 
liberalisation rate 99.8 percent in terms of the number of business sectors 
opened to FDI as mentioned earlier, and has erased complicated 
administrative procedures by dismantling or relaxing more than 50 percent of 
extant restrictions (KOTRA, 1999).  The new Act has eliminated 
discriminatory laws and regulations against foreign investors in the Korean 
real estate market and permitted M&A (including hostile M&A) by 
liberalising the capital market.  The new Act has also provided a variety of 
tax incentives for FDI.  
The business environment has also improved remarkably since 1997.  As 
a result of chaebol reforms, part of the institutionalised privileges bestowed 
on chaebols and the collusive government-chaebol relations have been 
eliminated.  Corporate governance and the management transparency and 
accountability of Korean firms have improved.  Penetration of foreign 
capital into the Korean business sector has reduced government intervention 
in business operations.  Reform of the Korean labour market has 
substantially improved its flexibility.  Management practices have 
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substantially changed toward the western style.  Korean society and culture 
have also changed.  In particular, many Koreans have changed their 
perceptions of incoming FDI and have come to appreciate the value of FDI in 
aiding recovery of the crisis-stricken economy and in sustaining economic 
prosperity.  Their discrimination against foreign companies and products 
has also declined considerably.  Korean workers’ preference of domestic 
firms to foreign firms has declined, leading foreign firms to find it easier to 
recruit and retain competent local staff. 6)  
How, then, would the relatively low magnitude of FDI in Korea and a 
recent sharp decline in FDI be explained? This study attempts to address this 
vexing question through investigating the motivations and issues faced by 
foreign investors in undertaking FDI and operating businesses in Korea.   
 
5. SURVEY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTORS 
 IN KOREA 
 
5.1. General Characteristics of Responding Companies 
 
As mentioned earlier, to investigate the causes for sluggish FDI in Korea 
from a foreign perspective, a comprehensive survey was conducted in 2002 
of foreign companies that had undertaken FDI and have been operating 
businesses in Korea.  The survey  questionnaire was distributed to about 
400 foreign companies in Korea and 69 of them (53 companies and 16 
individual foreign expatriates) responded.7)  
The business areas in which the company respondents have undertaken 
investment in Korea include 12 in the manufacturing sector and 39 in the 
service sector. 8 ) This distribution of respondents by industry broadly 
                                            
6) For further details of the change in the Korea FDI regime soon after the 1997 crisis, see 
Kwon (2001) Kim and Choo (2002), and Kim (2003). 
7) Individuals are those respondents who did not provide company details and therefore could 
not be identified in a particular sector.  
8) Two respondents failed to indicate the industries in which they had invested. The sums of 
the companies for their specific aspects are not equal to a total of 53 companies because 
some of the respondents did not respond to the relevant questions.  
Causes for Sluggish Foreign Direct Investment in Korea 81
represents that of the population, as indicated in Table 3.  In terms of 
ownership of the projects in which they had investment, 41 companies had 
100 percent ownership (fully owned branch, wholly owned subsidiary or 
independent company), and the remaining seven companies were joint 
ventures with Korean companies.  The chief executive officers were 
expatriates in 34 companies and Koreans in 16 companies.  In terms of the 
level of employment, 20 companies employed fewer than 50 workers 
(designated as small companies), and 26 companies employed more than 50 
workers.  
 
5.2. Survey Results 
 
5.2.1. Determinants of FDI in Korea 
From the literature on FDI (Dunning, 1998 and 2000; Kojima, 1978; 
Knickerbocker, 1973), 11 possible factors that would help foreigners 
determine their FDI choice in Korea were selected.  Nine variables 
concerned the location-specific factors, one variable concerned ownership 
advantage, and one concerned the oligopolistic behaviour of parent 
companies in their home countries.  The results for these questions appear 
in Table 4.  Serving the Korean market was the predominant motive of these 
companies to invest in Korea.  Of the 11 possible factors listed on the 
survey questionnaire, ‘expected growth of the Korean market’ ranked highest 
with an average score of 4.352 (Table 4).  Foreign business people had a 
negative view, though moderate, on the importance of the other location-
specific variables,  with mean scores ranging from 1.788 to 2.706.  These 
included ‘advanced related industries’, ‘easy access to information and 
technology’ ‘abundant skilled workers’, ‘investment incentives provided by 
Korea’, ‘easy access to parts and materials’, ‘low production costs’, and  
‘overcoming tariff and other import barriers’.  It is interesting to note that 
investment incentives by the Korean government was not regarded as an 
important factor.  As the Korean economy has been highly liberalised, with 
Trade regulations Consistent with the WTO principles, it was expected that 
overcoming tariff and other import barriers would not be regarded as an 
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Table 4  Determinants of FDI in Korea 
 
Factors N Average Ratings Standard Deviation 
Expected growth of the Korean market 54 4.352 0.850 
Advanced related industries in Korea 51 2.706 1.270 
Easy access to information and technology 52 2.385 1.140 
Abundant skilled workers 51 2.294 0.944 
Investment incentives offered by Korea 50 1.980 1.169 
Easy access to parts and materials 51 1.843 1.138 
Low production costs 51 1.804 1.077 
To overcome tariffs and other import barriers 52 1.788 1.177 
    
To make use of patents, technology, brands,  
 know-how or expertise of your company 
52 3.096 1.498 
    
To follow competitors’ entry into Korea 52 1.962 1.188 
To gain market access to other Asian markets 52 1.962 1.236 
 
influencing factor for FDI in Korea.   
As Dunning (1998) suggests, a firm entering from abroad must have some 
firm-specific advantages that its local competitors do not have.  To 
investigate the firm-specific advantages of foreign investors entering the 
Korean market, the questionnaire offered a question, ‘to make use of patents, 
technology, brands, know-how or expertise of your company’.  As shown in 
Table 4, foreign  firms were reasonably confident about their firm-specific 
advantages as a factor that had influenced their FDI in Korea, as reflected in 
the second highest average score of 3.096.  From the determinant factors to 
which foreign firms responded, it may be inferred that, as Dunning’s eclectic 
theory suggests, foreign firms invested in Korea to capitalise on the emerging 
business opportunities by means of their firm-specific advantages.   
It is interesting to note that ‘to follow competitors’ entry’ into Korea was 
ranked quite low at 1.962.  This suggests that Knickerbocker’s model of 
imitative FDI behaviour of following competitors is likely to have little 
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explanatory power for FDI  in Korea (Knickerbocker, 1973).  It also 
appears that foreign investors did not consider Korea as a stepping stone to 
other Asian markets, as shown by a low score of 1.962 for the factor ‘to gain 
market access to other Asian markets’.  This runs counter to the recent 
Korean campaign to promote Korea as the business hub of Northeast Asia.   
 
5.2.2. Difficulties in Setting up Investment Projects in Korea 
The survey also attempted to identify the factors that unfavourably 
affected foreign investment in Korea during the process of undertaking FDI 
with nine specific questions.  The survey findings suggest that foreign 
investors found that the procedure for investment in Korea was in general 
still onerous, as indicated by the overall average score of 2.952 for the nine 
questions (Table 5).  ‘Cultural and communication difficulties’ were most 
serious with an average score of 3.453.  ‘Complex administrative 
procedures’ were still considered difficult (3.420), indicating the need for 
improvement in the Korean government’s streamlining of the administrative 
procedures for FDI.  Another type of serious difficulty was related to 
understanding and dealing with Korean companies.  Foreign business 
people indicated ‘ineffective corporate governance of Korean firms’ as 
difficult.  Although rated 2.906, ‘opaque financial statements’ of Korean 
companies also appeared to be an area of concern.  These findings may 
indicate that, as seen by foreign business people, the reform of Korean 
companies has not been completed.  Other types of difficulties were not 
regarded as serious, with their mean scores ranging from 2.451 to 2.904.  
They included ‘difficulties in understanding the Korean market’, ‘militant 
unions’, ‘inadequate protection of intellectual properties’, ‘M&A’, and 
‘selecting business partners’.   
  
5.2.3. Improvement in the Korean Business Environment since 1997 
  There is no doubt that the business environment in Korea has an important 
bearing on FDI decisions in Korea, and it has been argued that Korea’s 
business environment has improved since 1997 (Kim and Choo 2002; Kim  
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Table 5  Difficulties in the FDI Procedure 
 
Types of difficulties N Average rating Standard deviation 
Cultural and communications difficulties 53 3.453 1.186 
Complex administrative procedures 50 3.420 0.992 
Ineffective corporate governance of Korean firms 52 3.212 1.304 
Opaque financial statements of Korean firms 53 2.906 1.377 
Difficulties in understanding the Korean market 52 2.904 1.176 
Concerns with militant unions 51 2.843 1.488 
Inadequate protection of intellectual properties 52 2.827 1.382 
Difficulties in M&A 51 2.549 1.390 
Difficulties in selecting business partners 51 2.451 1.154 
 Average 51 2.952 1.272 
 
2003; Kim and Kim 2003).  To assess this argument and to identify specific 
improvements, if any, in the Korean business environment as observed by 
foreign business people, the questionnaire included 17 questions.  Each of 
these questions and its rating are shown in Table 6.  Foreign business people 
had a moderately negative view in general of the improvement in the 
business environment in Korea, as indicated by an overall average rating of 
2.725.   
With regard to improvements in the areas related to political risk and 
government–business relations, respondents expressed negative opinions on 
all except  ‘political stability’.  They considered that ‘political stability’ 
had improved moderately in South Korea with a mean score of 3.333.  
However, they did not consider that significant improvements had occurred in 
other areas such as ‘North–South Korean relations’, ‘transparency and consistency 
in government regulations’, ‘government regulations and interference’,  
‘cronyism and corruption’, ‘protection of intellectual property rights’, ‘regulation 
of the real estate market’, and ‘distribution system’ with mean scores ranging 
from 2.467 to 2.841. 
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Table 6  Improvements in the Korean Business Environment 
 
Types of Improvements N Average rating Standard deviation 
Political stability in South Korea 63 3.333 0.916 
More transparent and consistent regulations 63 2.841 0.971 
Decreases in government regulations and interference 64 2.797 0.995 
Improving North–South Korean relations 62 2.726 1.190 
Decreasing cronyism and corruption 64 2.594 0.921 
Improving intellectual property right protection  62 2.565 1.096 
Deregulation of the real estate market 59 2.525 0.971 
Declining entry barriers into Korean distribution 
     system 
60 2.467 0.929 
Optimistic economic prospects 63 3.746 0.950 
Koreans becoming better business partners 61 2.820 1.088 
Level-field competition with Korean firms 63 2.524 0.965 
Decreasing importance of personal relationships 
      in business 
62 2.274 0.926 
Easier to hire and retain local workers 61 2.672 0.870 
Easier to dismiss Korean workers 62 2.435 1.140 
Declining union militancy 61 2.410 1.023 
Declining Koreans’ discrimination against foreign 
      products 
62 2.887 1.088 
Declining cultural and communication difficulties 63 2.714 1.054 
Average 62 2.725 1.005 
 
Interviews with survey participants revealed their view that there was 
substantial inconsistency in the policies, regulations and administrative 
procedures between the central and local governments.  Some foreign 
expatriates voiced their concern at the opacity and variability in interpreting 
and applying regulations at the local government level.  They were also 
aggrieved by inter-authority turf wars between fire, police, construction, and 
environmental authorities at both local and regional levels, since these battles 
delay approval requirements.   
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In terms of business prospects and business relations with Korean 
companies, respondents were quite optimistic about the improvement of  
Korean ‘economic prospects’, with a mean score of 3.746.  However, they 
had negative views on improvements in their business relations with Korean 
companies.  Views on improvements in Korean companies ‘becoming better 
business partners’ or ‘engaging in level playing-field competition’ were 
moderately negative.  It is instructive to note that foreign business people 
did not consider that the ‘importance of personal relationships in daily 
business operations’ had declined, as indicated by a mean score of 2.274.  
This runs counter to an intuitive  perception of many business people in 
Korea that the Korean management system has of necessity shifted 
substantially toward a western system that stresses rationality over personal 
relationships.  Respondents’ view about the persistent importance of 
personal relationships in business operations in  Korea supports the long-
held belief that cultures die hard.     
Foreign business expatriates expressed quite strongly negative views on 
improvements in labour relations.  They had negative, though moderate, 
views about Korea becoming ‘easier to hire and retain local workers’ and  
‘easier to dismiss Korean workers’.  Likewise, they strongly disagreed with 
the statement on ‘declining union militancy’ with a mean score of 2.410.  
Through personal interviews, survey participants expressed strong feelings 
about the inflexibility of Korean workers, and that militant unions were one 
of the major difficulties in Korea.   
Foreign business people expressed negative views, though moderate, 
regarding both declining discrimination in Korean society against foreigners 
and foreign products, and abating cultural and communication difficulties, as 
indicated by mean scores of 2.887and 2.714 respectively.  In personal 
interviews, participants expressed views that Koreans are still nationalistic 
and narrow-minded and do not appreciate racial diversity in the world as a 
matter of fact.  Some participants also spoke of conflicts they experienced 
with Korean partners and other Koreans as a result of a lack of understanding 
of each other’s cultures and institutions. 
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5.2.4. Management of on-site operations in Korea 
The survey questionnaire included 19 questions designed to identify 
difficulties encountered in operating and managing businesses in Korea.  
The results were consistent with the negative views, mentioned above, on 
improvements in the Korean business environment.  As shown in Table 7, 
most of the on-site operational difficulties raised in the questionnaire rated 
quite high scores, with an overall average score of 3.186.  This contrasts 
with the difficulties encountered in the process of undertaking FDI, which 
respondents ranked relatively lowly (Table 5).  These survey findings may 
indicate that, while the Korean government provides various types of support, 
incentives and assistance to attract FDI and streamline FDI procedures, it 
does not perform as well in supporting the on-site operations of FDI projects.  
It should be noted here that a major portion of the  difficulties in on-site 
management are related to Korean companies or market forces, which are 
beyond government control in the more liberalized market.   
In the area of government–business relations, ‘lack of transparency and 
consistency in regulations’, ‘prevailing cronyism and corruption’, ‘excessive 
discretionary power of bureaucrats’, and ‘excessive government regulations’  
were all regarded as difficult areas, with mean scores ranging from 3.516 to 
3.836.  The ‘tax system’ and ‘poor social overhead capital (infrastructure)’ 
were not regarded as seriously difficult areas. 
Regarding their business operations and relations with Korean companies, 
respondents rated ‘importance of personal relationships in business’ as the 
most difficult area and ‘unfair advantages held by Korean firms, especially 
chaebols’ as the second most difficult area with the average scores of 3.836 
and 3.651 respectively.  Because respondents perceived Korean firms as still 
relying heavily on personal relationships in business operations, they 
considered themselves disadvantaged.  This is quite different from the 
prevailing perception among Korean business people that Korean  
management is moving towards western management in which personal 
relationships have much less bearing on business operation.  Other on-site 
managerial issues such as ‘high overhead costs (rent, insurance, utilities)’ 
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Table 7  Difficulties in On-site Management 
 
Types of Difficulties N Average rating Standard deviation 
Lack of transparency and consistency in 
regulations 
61 3.836 1.083 
Prevailing cronyism and corruption 63 3.714  1.300 
Excessive discretionary power of bureaucrats 61 3.705 1.387 
Excessive government regulations  62 3.516 1.238 
Complex tax systems 61 2.820 1.041 
Poor social overhead capital (infrastructure) 61 2.656 1.124 
Importance of personal relationship in business 61 3.836 1.083 
Unfair advantages held by Korean firms 
(chaebols) 
63 3.651 1.322 
High overhead costs (rent, insurance, utilities) 61 2.967 1.238 
High entry barriers to the distribution system 62 2.790 1.332 
Conflicts with Korean partners  60 2.567 1.407 
Difficulties in getting parts and materials 60 2.183 1.295 
Difficulties in recruiting and retaining efficient 
localworkers 
61 3.066 1.223 
High wage and low labour productivity 63 3.048 1.156 
Militant unions 60 2.767 1.407 
Cultural and communication differences 62 3.597 1.108 
Koreans’ prejudice against foreign firms and  
foreign products 
62 3.371 1.283 
Korean society closed to foreigners 60 3.333 1.100 
Poor social amenities for expatriates’ families 60 3.117 1.329 
Average 61 3.186 1.159 
 
‘entry into the Korean distribution system’, ‘conflicts with Korean partners’, 
and ‘getting parts and materials’, were not considered as serious with mean 
scores ranging from 2.183 to 2.967.   
In the area of human resource management, ‘recruiting and retaining 
efficient local workers’ and ‘high wage levels and low labour productivity’ 
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were regarded as areas of concern.  This is consistent with views discussed 
above, indicating that respondents saw human resources as an area that had 
not improved in recent years.  ‘Militant unions’ were not regarded as part of 
the major management difficulties with a score of 2.767, even though, as 
indicated above, respondents claimed that union militancy had not improved.  
This perception appears to be attributable to the characteristics of 
respondents, in that the majority of the responding companies were in the 
service sector where unions are typically less problematic.   
Foreign business people considered that coping with culture and society 
was difficult for them and, as indicated above, they felt that circumstances 
had not improved significantly for them in recent times.  ‘Cultural and 
communication differences’, ‘Koreans prejudice against foreign firms and 
products’, and ‘Korean society closed to foreigners’ were all regarded as 
serious concerns with mean scores ranging from 3.333 to 3.597.  Finally, 
many respondents regarded poor social amenities for expatriates’ families as 
a serious concern, with a score of 3.117. 
 
5.2.5. Respondents’ Views of Korean Firms (Chaebols)  
How foreign business people perceive chaebols as business partners would 
have a significant bearing on their investment decision.  Hence, the 
questionnaire asked six questions to identify how foreign respondents 
perceived recent changes in chaebols as their business counterparts.  As 
shown in Table 8, foreign business people had negative views on the 
improvement of chaebols as indicated by an overall average score of 2.501.  
Related to chaebol reform, foreign respondents did not consider that 
‘corporate governance’ and ‘operational transparency’ had been improved as 
indicated by average scores of 2.525 and 2.468 respectively.  They did not 
consider chaebols as ‘becoming more efficient recently’, with a mean score 
of 2.844. 
It appears that foreign business people view chaebols as adversarial 
competitors.  They did not view the chaebols’ dominance in Korean 
business as declining, nor did they view chaebols as becoming more 
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  Table 8  Recent Changes in Chaebols 
 
Types of Changes N Average rating Standard deviation 
Better corporate governance 59 2.525 0.953 
More transparent operation 62 2.468 0.987 
Becoming more efficient recently 64 2.844 0.821 
Declining dominance in Korean business 64 2.531 1.168 
More cooperative as business partners 63 2.603 0.773 
Competing on a level-playing field 63 2.032 0.842 
 Average 63 2.501 0.924 
 
cooperative business partners.  In particular, they did not think that chaebols 
were competing on a level-playing field.   
 
5.2.6. Respondents’ Views of Korean Workers  
The questionnaire included 10 questions related to foreigners’ views of 
Korean workers.  Seven questions enquired about positive aspects of 
Korean workers and the remaining three asked about the negative aspects of 
Korean workers.  Foreign business people agreed strongly with the positive 
attributes of Korean workers with an overall average score of 3.297.  They 
disagreed marginally with negative aspects, with an overall average score of 
2.958 (Table 9).   
The mean scores for five of the seven questions regarding the positive 
characteristics of Korean workers were higher than 3.0. Of the seven 
questions, the highest score of 3.656 was given to the statement that Korean 
workers were ‘willing to work for foreign companies’.  This may show a 
significant change in the mind-set of Korean workers, as their earlier 
preference was to work for domestic companies.  Korean workers have 
areputation as hard working and highly skilled.  These characteristics are 
reflected in a high score of 3.594 for the response to ‘hard working’.  
Foreign business people also agreed with other positive aspects of Korean  
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Table 9  Characteristics of Korean Workers 
 
Characteristics of Korean workers N Average rating Standard deviation 
Willing to work for foreign companies 64 3.656 0.877 
Hard working 64 3.594 1.205 
Highly loyal to company and supervisors 65 3.477 1.120 
Highly collaborative team spirit  65 3.431 1.131 
Willing to be trained for new jobs 65 3.185 1.088 
Highly skilled and efficient 65 2.923 0.973 
Highly reliable and stable 65 2.815 0.983 
Average of the above 7 items 65 3.297 1.054 
Low English language skill 57 3.281 0.959 
Highly unionized and militant 46 2.826 1.161 
Changing jobs frequently 64 2.766 1.151 
Average of the above 3 items 56 2.958 1.090 
 
workers, such as being ‘highly loyal to their companies and supervisors’, 
having ‘highly collaborative team spirit’, and being ‘willing to be trained for 
new jobs’.  However, foreigners did not consider Korean workers as being 
‘highly skilled and efficient’, nor possessing ‘high reliability and stability’ 
with mean scores of 2.923 and 2.815 respectively.  Overall, however, these 
survey findings appear to confirm the reputable nature of Korean workers. 
Of the negative aspects of Korean workers, poor English language skills 
was rated as the most serious issue, with an average score of 3.281.  ‘Highly 
unionised and militant’ characteristics of Korean workers were not too 
serious a concern, as indicated by a score of 2.826.  This is consistent with 
the view of foreign expatriates that, as pointed out earlier, while militant 
unions are a concern, they are not a serious issue for on-site management.  
The rating of concern about low English language skills being higher than 
concern about union militancy suggests clearly the direction needed in 
human resource development policy.  Finally, foreigners disagreed, 
although modestly, with the idea that Korean workers ‘change jobs 
frequently’.   
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5.2.7. Respondents’ Views of Expatriates’ Living Conditions in          
Korea 
The survey questionnaire included a set of questions, seeking to identify 
views about some improvements, if any, in the living conditions of foreign 
expatriates.As shown in Table 10, foreign expatriates had strongly negative 
opinions on improvements in their living conditions in Korea, as indicated by 
an overall average rate of 2.192 for the seven possible types of improvements.   
 
Table 10  Expatriates’ Living Conditions in Korea 
 
Types of Improvements N Average rating Standard deviation 
Improving social amenities (crime, traffic 
accidents, etc) 
68 3.015 1.165 
Declining prejudice against foreigners  68 2.765 1.024 
Improving overall living costs 65 2.154 0.939 
Reasonable rent and real estate prices 68 1.956 1.085 
Improving environmental pollution 67 1.940 0.936 
Declining traffic congestion 68 1.735 0.891 
 Average 66 2.192 0.991 
 
They viewed that ‘social amenities’ had improved marginally, as indicated 
by a mean score of 3.015.  However, the remaining types of improvement in 
living conditions, such as Koreans’ ‘declining prejudice against foreigners’, 
‘improving overall living costs’, ‘reasonable rent and real estate prices’, 
‘improving environmental pollution’, and ‘declining traffic congestion’ were 
all rated quite low, ranging from 1.735 to 2.765.  These negative views on 
improvements in the living conditions of foreign expatriates are consistent 
with their concerns about poor social amenities of expatriates’ families, as 
shown in Table 7.  These findings suggest that in its bid to attract more FDI, 
the government should pay more attention to improving the living conditions 
of foreign expatriates.   
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Korean government restricted and controlled FDI up to the 1997 
financial crisis, largely because of its historical obsession with protecting 
domestic industries and management control.  The Korean economic 
structure, society and business culture were not conducive to incoming FDI 
either.  As a result, Korea was regarded as the worst place to invest among 
Asian nations until 1997.  Restrictions on FDI and unhealthy FDI 
environments were reflected in flagging levels of FDI at this time.   
Since the 1997 financial crisis, the Korean government has undertaken a 
paradigm shift in its FDI policy from “restriction and control” to “promotion 
and assistance”, and has undertaken a series of policy measures and all-out 
efforts to improve the business environment and attract FDI.  As a result, 
FDI in Korea increased remarkably between 1998 and 2000.   Despite this 
spurt, Korea still attracted FDI that was less than a level comparable 
internationally.  In addition,  FDI in Korea decreased substantially over 
three consecutive years from 2001 to 2003.  In order to investigate the 
causes for sluggish FDI in Korea, a comprehensive survey was conducted of 
foreign companies that had undertaken FDI and have been operating business 
in Korea.   
According to the survey results, foreign firms chose to pursue FDI in 
Korea to capitalise on the emerging business opportunities in Korea by 
means of their firm-specific advantages.  Foreign firms did not regard Korea 
as a target country for supply-seeking investment.   They did not consider 
Korea as having competitive production costs, nor being a stepping stone to 
gain market access to other Asian countries.  Additionally, foreign investors 
did not see investment incentives by the Korean government as an important 
factor for attracting their investment to Korea.    
The survey results indicate that foreign investors encountered various 
types of difficulties in establishing FDI projects in Korea.  Although formal 
entry barriers such as the approval process and FDI-restricted industrial 
sectors have been dismantled to the level of OECD countries, the FDI 
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preparation process and the business operational environment have not 
improved significantly.  The challenges in the investment preparation 
process and on-site management arise not only from excessive, complex and 
opaque government regulations, excessive bureaucratic power and 
bureaucratic stonewalling, but also from unique Korean business cultures,  
unfair advantages held by domestic firms, and cultural and societal 
differences.  
Some studies have attributed recent decreases in FDI to some external 
factors such as economic stagnation in the world particularly in the United 
States and Japan, the September 11, 2001 terror attack, and China’s accession 
to the WTO (Kim, 2002, 2003).  However, the present study shows that to 
further attract FDI, not only should Korea undertake an across-the-board 
liberalization of the FDI regime, but it should also improve the operational 
environment for foreign businesses.  Although the FDI regime has been 
liberalised and the entry procedure has been streamlined substantially, the 
present study clearly indicates that there is substantial room to improve in the 
areas of government regulations, policy making and implementation, both at 
the central and local levels of government.  To improve the poor quality of 
the domestic business environment, not only should excessive government 
regulations and bureaucratic power be removed, but unfair advantages 
bestowed on domestic firms, continued rigidities in the labour market and the 
living conditions of foreign expatriates should also be improved.  
Furthermore, Korean society and Koreans need to become more open and 
amicable to foreigners and foreign business operations in Korea.   
The challenges confronting foreign firms that have been examined in this 
study are the perceptions of survey respondents.  The people of Korea may 
disagree profoundly with the respondents’ claims.  Nevertheless, since the 
respondents have first-hand experience of FDI in Korea and it is these types 
of investors that the Korean government is trying to attract, the survey 
findings of this study point to a number of areas that government policy 
should reconsider in its bid to increase inward FDI in Korea.   
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